Showing posts with label Distribution. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Distribution. Show all posts

Wednesday, July 17, 2013

Distribution of the 2001-2006 Tax Cuts : Updated Projections, July 2008

library Distribution of the 2001-2006 Tax CutsGreg Leiserson, Jeff Rohaly

The nonpartisan Urban Institute publishes studies, reports, and books on timely topics worthy of public consideration. The views expressed are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Urban Institute, its trustees, or its funders.

The text below is an excerpt from the complete document. Read the full report in PDF format.

Since 2001, Congress has passed a major tax bill almost every year. Most have reduced taxes significantly and, since they were not accompanied by spending cuts, the resulting deficits have increased the national debt. The tax cuts total almost $2.2 trillion over ten years, and that total may be vastly understated if some or all of the cuts are extended beyond their scheduled expiration date of 2010. In addition, the cuts exacerbated the growing problem of the alternative minimum tax (AMT). Barring legislative action, more than 33 million taxpayers will fall prey to the AMT in 2010.

Since 2001, Congress has passed a major tax bill almost every year. Most have reduced taxes significantly and, since they were not accompanied by spending cuts, the resulting deficits have increased the national debt. The largest revenue loss—$1.35 trillion over ten years—came from the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA). The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA) reduced revenues by another $350 billion (again over the subsequent decade). Subsequent legislation cut taxes further: $146 billion in 2004 (WFTRA), $142 billion in 2006 (TIPRA and PPA), $51 billion in 2007 (TIPA), and $125 billion in 2008 (ESA). The tax cuts total almost $2.2 trillion over ten years, and that total may be vastly understated if some or all of the cuts are extended beyond their scheduled expiration date of 2010. In addition, the cuts exacerbated the growing problem of the alternative minimum tax (AMT). Barring legislative action, more than 33 million taxpayers will fall prey to the AMT in 2010. It is highly unlikely that Congress will allow this to happen but simply extending the AMT “patch” through the end of 2010 would add another $207 billion to the cost of the tax cuts.

As Congress and the new President consider whether to extend some or all of the tax cuts, they should take into account the distribution of the tax cuts and how that distribution would change if the cuts were combined with measures to finance the resulting budget deficits. Although the long-term distributional effects of the 2001-06 tax cuts will depend on how they are ultimately paid for, the immediate benefits are skewed in favor of high-income taxpayers. In 2010, when the cuts are fully phased in, households in the middle fifth of the income distribution will receive an average tax reduction equal to 2.6 percent of after-tax income. Households in the top quintile—the 20 percent of the population with the highest incomes—will receive an average tax cut that is more than twice as large: 5.4 percent of income. Those in the bottom quintile will get an average cut equal to just 0.7 percent of income. Taxpayers at the very top of the income scale benefit the most. Those in the top one percent will receive a 7.3 percent average increase in after-tax income in 2010; those in the top one-tenth of one percent—the richest 1 in 1,000 taxpayers—will see their after-tax incomes rise an average of 8.2 percent.

Over the long-term, Congress must finance tax cuts through spending reductions, other tax increases, or a combination of the two. The financing approach chosen will significantly affect the ultimate distributional impact of the cuts. For example, if the revenue loss from the 2001–06 tax cuts and an accompanying fix for the AMT were offset by an additional tax levied in proportion to income, the combination would transfer after-tax income from the poorest four-fifths of households to the richest fifth. Only taxpayers in the top quintile of the income distribution would, on average, receive an increase in after-tax income. Average after-tax incomes would fall for households in the bottom eighty percent of the income distribution. Households in the lowest quintile would face an average tax increase equal to 2.6 percent of after-tax income whereas taxpayers in the top quintile would see a tax cut equal to 1.0 percent of income on average. Taxpayers in the top one percent would see an average tax reduction equivalent to 2.6 percent of income.

This paper summarizes the Tax Policy Center’s (TPC) latest estimates of the distributional impact of the 2001–06 tax cuts. We include the impact of all major individual income and estate tax provisions in the seven tax acts. Our distribution tables include individual and corporate income taxes, payroll taxes for Social Security and Medicare, and the estate tax. More information and additional detailed distribution tables can be found on our web site at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org.

(End of excerpt. The entire report is available in PDF format.)


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The Future of Individual Tax Rates: Effects of Economic Growth and Distribution : Leonard Burman's Testimony before the Senate Committee on Finance

library The Future of Individual Tax Rates: Effects of Economic Growth and DistributionLeonard E. Burman

The text below is an excerpt from the complete testimony. Read the full written testimony in PDF format.

Leonard Burman's testimony before the Senate Committee on Finance on whether and how to extend the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts.

Chairman Baucus, Ranking Member Grassley, Members of the Committee: Thank you for inviting me to share my views on whether and how to extend the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts. I am speaking for myself alone. My views should not be attributed to any of the organizations with which I am affiliated.

The expiration of the "Bush tax cuts" at the end of 2010 creates a number of decision points for the Congress: Should all or some of the tax cuts be extended? If so, should they be made permanent? If not, how long should they be extended for? And, if only some of the tax cuts are to be extended, which ones?

In short, I believe it would be a serious mistake to make any of the tax cuts permanent now. The income tax is a mess and is badly in need of an overhaul. It doesn't raise close to enough revenue to pay for current governmental expenditures and is needlessly complex, unfair, and inefficient. A system-wide reform along the lines of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, but with the goal of eventually raising enough revenue get the national debt out of the red zone should be a top priority for the Congress. Permanent extension of the tax cuts would make such a reform far more difficult and would signal to markets that our budget problems are only going to get worse.

However, I also think it would be a mistake to allow all of the tax cuts to expire as scheduled in 2011. The economy is in a very precarious state and a major tax increase would slow the economic recovery. With credit still in very short supply, low- and middle-income households are facing serious cash flow constraints. A tax increase would result in less spending, which would ripple through the economy, costing jobs and threatening the nascent recovery.


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The Future of Individual Tax Rates: Effects on Growth and Distribution : Donald Marron's Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Finance

library The Future of Individual Tax Rates: Effects on Growth and DistributionDonald Marron

The text below is an excerpt from the complete testimony. Read the full written testimony in PDF format.

Donald Marron's testimony before the Senate Committee on Finance on the individual tax system.

Chairman Baucus, Ranking Member Grassley, and Members of the Committee: Thank you for inviting me to appear today to discuss our individual income tax system.

As this committee knows well, our nation faces difficult economic and fiscal challenges. In the aftermath of the worst financial crisis since the 1930s, almost 15 million workers are unemployed, about one-tenth of our work force. Almost 7 million of those workers have been unemployed for six months or longer. And millions more lack jobs but don't count in the statistics because they're too discouraged to look for work. Moderate economic growth is expected to lower those figures only gradually over the next few years.

At the same time, budget deficits have rocketed to 60-year highs because of the financial crisis, the weak economy, and subsequent policy responses. As a result, the federal debt has grown from about 40 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2008 to about 60 percent of GDP today, the highest since just after World War II.

Deficits should narrow in coming years as the economy recovers and as policy responses to the recession wind down. Our long-term fiscal outlook remains daunting, however, because of a fundamental imbalance between spending and revenues. Because of an aging population and rising health care costs, spending is expected to grow significantly faster than revenues over the next 25 years, pushing our nation deeper into debt.


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