Showing posts with label 20012006. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 20012006. Show all posts

Wednesday, July 17, 2013

Tax Fairness, the 2001-2006 Tax Cuts, and the AMT : Testimony before the U.S. House Committee on Ways and Means

library Tax Fairness, the 2001-2006 Tax Cuts, and the AMTLeonard E. Burman

The nonpartisan Urban Institute publishes studies, reports, and books on timely topics worthy of public consideration. The views expressed are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Urban Institute, its trustees, or its funders.

In this testimony Burman discusses the issues of tax fairness, the 2001 to 2006 tax cuts, and the individual alternative minimum tax. Burman argues that while the federal tax system mitigates economic inequality, the recent tax cuts have disproportionately benefited those at the top, while also increasing the number of people potentially subject to the AMT. He concludes with a brief discussion of how to fix the AMT in a fiscally responsible manner.

The text below is Burman's oral testimony.
Read the full written testimony in PDF format.

Chairman Rangel, Ranking Member McCrery, Members of the Committee: Thank you for inviting me to discuss the issues of tax fairness, the 2001 to 2006 tax cuts, and the individual alternative minimum tax (AMT).

Economic inequality is rising dramatically. Middle class families are working harder than ever and productivity is soaring, but almost all of the gains are going to a tiny sliver of the population at the very top of the income scale.

What explains rising inequality? Increased globalization, information technology, the decline in labor unions, and the development of a winner-take-all society where top performers receive almost all of the economic rewards are all candidate explanations. None of these factors is likely to reverse, so the trend in inequality appears inexorable.

This is a problem. First, it is demoralizing for families to work so hard and fall further and further behind. Second, even if you believed that most economic growth arises from the efforts of a few highly talented individuals who deserved their outsized pay, rising inequality spurs populist calls for measures that could be very damaging to the economy, such as trade restrictions.

By comparison, a progressive income tax is a relatively efficient way to reduce the disparity of after-tax incomes. But at the same time that income inequality has been approaching levels not seen since the great depression, the federal tax system has become much less progressive.

Congress has enacted more than $2 trillion in tax cuts since 2001, disproportionately concentrated on the rich. In 2006, the bottom 20 percent of income earners got on average $20—0.3 percent of their income. Most in that income group got nothing. The top 20 percent got an average tax cut of almost $5,800, or 5.4 percent of income. At the very top, where the big winners in the economic lottery reside, the average tax cut was more than 6 percent of income.

The tax cuts had another unfortunate side effect: they threaten to throw millions of American families onto the AMT. Under current law, over 23 million taxpayers will owe AMT this year. That is more than twice the number who would have been subject to the tax if the Bush tax cuts had not been enacted. The tax now hits families with very modest incomes and no special deductions. For example, a couple with four kids earning $75,000 would see their tax more than double in 2007 because of the AMT.

The AMT also—at least in theory—takes back a substantial portion of the Bush tax cuts. Unless Congress prevents it, the AMT will slice 20 percent off of the tax cuts in 2007. Because they’re on the AMT, that hypothetical family of six would get no benefit from the lower tax rates or higher standard deduction enacted in 2001.

Of course, Congress doesn’t want to face the wrath of 23 million angry AMT taxpayers. If past practice is a guide, you will again raise the AMT exemption for a year or two to spare most of the middle class from the tax.

But this means that the 2001 to 2006 tax cuts were really a lot bigger than budgeted. The total bill includes the cost of the periodic, increasingly expensive, patches. In 2007, the patch would reduce revenues by over $50 billion. Put differently, the AMT masked a big part of the tax cuts, and probably allowed Congress to enact cuts much larger than it would have, had all of the costs been considered.

The ironic fact is that, even though the AMT appears to be a money machine, it has actually undermined fiscal discipline by hiding the full cost of large tax cuts.

The AMT has other notorious defects. It is hideously complex. It actually raises marginal tax rates on most of its victims, undermining economic efficiency. And it is unfair—hammering married couples, especially those with children—and disallowing legitimate deductions. It is the perfect storm of bad tax policy.

What to do about this mess? The best approach would be to finance repeal of the AMT by broadening the tax base—for example, eliminating the deductibility of state and local taxes—rather than raising rates. Even better, AMT repeal could be part of fundamental tax reform, but there are obvious political challenges to either approach.

Fortunately, intermediate options exist that would help a lot. I have suggested financing AMT repeal with a surtax that would apply only to high-income taxpayers (Burman and Leiserson 2007). It would be very simple for taxpayers to comprehend and comply with. The Ways and Means Committee majority staff has reportedly considered retargeting the AMT at those with very high incomes and offsetting the revenue loss through an additional income tax.

Any repeal or reform option should be budget neutral, as the PAYGO rules require. Repealing the AMT without offsetting tax increases or spending cuts would drain federal tax revenues just as the baby boomers start retiring and demands on the federal government begin to swell. Outright repeal of the AMT without any other offsetting changes would reduce tax revenues by more than $800 billion through fiscal year 2017, assuming that the 2001–2006 tax cuts expire as scheduled. If the tax cuts are extended, the revenue loss nearly doubles to almost $1.6 trillion.

The text above is Burman's oral testimony.
Read the full written testimony in PDF format.

The views expressed are those of the author and should not be attributed to the Urban Institute, its trustees, or its funders.


View the original article here

Distribution of the 2001-2006 Tax Cuts : Updated Projections, July 2008

library Distribution of the 2001-2006 Tax CutsGreg Leiserson, Jeff Rohaly

The nonpartisan Urban Institute publishes studies, reports, and books on timely topics worthy of public consideration. The views expressed are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Urban Institute, its trustees, or its funders.

The text below is an excerpt from the complete document. Read the full report in PDF format.

Since 2001, Congress has passed a major tax bill almost every year. Most have reduced taxes significantly and, since they were not accompanied by spending cuts, the resulting deficits have increased the national debt. The tax cuts total almost $2.2 trillion over ten years, and that total may be vastly understated if some or all of the cuts are extended beyond their scheduled expiration date of 2010. In addition, the cuts exacerbated the growing problem of the alternative minimum tax (AMT). Barring legislative action, more than 33 million taxpayers will fall prey to the AMT in 2010.

Since 2001, Congress has passed a major tax bill almost every year. Most have reduced taxes significantly and, since they were not accompanied by spending cuts, the resulting deficits have increased the national debt. The largest revenue loss—$1.35 trillion over ten years—came from the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA). The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA) reduced revenues by another $350 billion (again over the subsequent decade). Subsequent legislation cut taxes further: $146 billion in 2004 (WFTRA), $142 billion in 2006 (TIPRA and PPA), $51 billion in 2007 (TIPA), and $125 billion in 2008 (ESA). The tax cuts total almost $2.2 trillion over ten years, and that total may be vastly understated if some or all of the cuts are extended beyond their scheduled expiration date of 2010. In addition, the cuts exacerbated the growing problem of the alternative minimum tax (AMT). Barring legislative action, more than 33 million taxpayers will fall prey to the AMT in 2010. It is highly unlikely that Congress will allow this to happen but simply extending the AMT “patch” through the end of 2010 would add another $207 billion to the cost of the tax cuts.

As Congress and the new President consider whether to extend some or all of the tax cuts, they should take into account the distribution of the tax cuts and how that distribution would change if the cuts were combined with measures to finance the resulting budget deficits. Although the long-term distributional effects of the 2001-06 tax cuts will depend on how they are ultimately paid for, the immediate benefits are skewed in favor of high-income taxpayers. In 2010, when the cuts are fully phased in, households in the middle fifth of the income distribution will receive an average tax reduction equal to 2.6 percent of after-tax income. Households in the top quintile—the 20 percent of the population with the highest incomes—will receive an average tax cut that is more than twice as large: 5.4 percent of income. Those in the bottom quintile will get an average cut equal to just 0.7 percent of income. Taxpayers at the very top of the income scale benefit the most. Those in the top one percent will receive a 7.3 percent average increase in after-tax income in 2010; those in the top one-tenth of one percent—the richest 1 in 1,000 taxpayers—will see their after-tax incomes rise an average of 8.2 percent.

Over the long-term, Congress must finance tax cuts through spending reductions, other tax increases, or a combination of the two. The financing approach chosen will significantly affect the ultimate distributional impact of the cuts. For example, if the revenue loss from the 2001–06 tax cuts and an accompanying fix for the AMT were offset by an additional tax levied in proportion to income, the combination would transfer after-tax income from the poorest four-fifths of households to the richest fifth. Only taxpayers in the top quintile of the income distribution would, on average, receive an increase in after-tax income. Average after-tax incomes would fall for households in the bottom eighty percent of the income distribution. Households in the lowest quintile would face an average tax increase equal to 2.6 percent of after-tax income whereas taxpayers in the top quintile would see a tax cut equal to 1.0 percent of income on average. Taxpayers in the top one percent would see an average tax reduction equivalent to 2.6 percent of income.

This paper summarizes the Tax Policy Center’s (TPC) latest estimates of the distributional impact of the 2001–06 tax cuts. We include the impact of all major individual income and estate tax provisions in the seven tax acts. Our distribution tables include individual and corporate income taxes, payroll taxes for Social Security and Medicare, and the estate tax. More information and additional detailed distribution tables can be found on our web site at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org.

(End of excerpt. The entire report is available in PDF format.)


View the original article here